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In 1974 Group Captain Frederick Winterbotham shocked the world when he revealed in his semi-
autobiographical work, The Ultra Secret, that the 
Allies had been breaking high-grade German 
ciphers throughout the greater portion of the 
Second World War in an effort commonly referred 
to as ULTRA.1 His disclosure sparked a tempest 
as historians anticipated that his admission 
would lead to a major revision of Second World 
War historiography. At first, what promised to be 
a new vista for historical research soon turned 
into a quagmire. When the British Government 
selectively released files pertaining to ULTRA, 
only messages sent to commands in the field 
were originally released whereas the supporting 
documents necessary to properly assess and 
interpret the impact of ULTRA in general, and 
on Army Group, Army and Corps commanders 
and their subordinates in the field in particular, 
were retained. As a result, the reassessment of 
this aspect of military history met a similar fate 
to that of British armour at the foot of Verrières-
Bourgébus ridge during Operation Goodwood – 
very good initial progress followed by confusion 
and lack of consolidation resulting in the 
perception that ULTRA was nothing more than 
a highly overrated white elephant. Two decades 
later, Government Communication Headquarters 
(GCHQ) in the UK wisely reviewed their policy and 
began a protracted release of millions of pages of 
material to coincide with the 50th anniversary of 
the end of the Second World War. Included were 
materials that shed new light on the production 
and dissemination of ULTRA (at Bletchley Park) 
and its employment by the consumer, Allied High 
Command, in the field.2 The releases have thus 
far included everything from security regulations 
for the handling of messages, to classified in-
house accounts of the impact of ULTRA on 
commands, to high-level policy papers and 
distribution lists to name but a few. In addition 
to the ULTRA material, formerly classified 
Intelligence summaries (produced at each 
level of command from Eisenhower’s Supreme 
Headquarters down to brigade level) were also 
declassified during this period providing the 
historian with two mutually supporting sources 
to layer upon the existing corpus of material.3  As 
a result, new insight and further understanding 
can be achieved concerning intentions, orders, 
decisions and operations that may have been 
regarded, at that time or since, as peculiar, 
questionable or ill-conceived. The impact of these 
new releases on the historiography of Canada’s 
role in the Second World War can be witnessed 
in part by re-examining the costly and seemingly 
questionable advance by the Black Watch (Royal 
Highland Regiment) of Canada on May-sur-Orne 
during the afternoon of 5 August 1944.
 The first attempt by the Black Watch to by-
pass May-sur-Orne on the morning of 25 July 
during Operation Spring ended in disaster as 
300 of 315 men were lost attempting to capture 
the town of Fontenay-le-Marmion on the reverse 
slope of Verrières Ridge. In fact, during their first 
week of fighting in Normandy, the 1st Battalion 
of the Black Watch sustained heavy casualties 
that included one commanding officer, his battle 
adjutant, all the rifle company commanders, their 
second-in-commands and the majority of senior 
NCOs.4 When Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Mitchell 
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took command of the remnants of the battalion 
the day after Spring, only two of the six remaining 
officers had any battle experience.5  This was 
further reduced when Lieutenant George Buch 
was wounded a few hours after Mitchell arrived, 
leaving only Captain Ronnie Bennett as the lone 
senior Black Watch officer to see combat.6  As a 
result, Mitchell faced the task of rebuilding and 
retraining four Black Watch rifle companies that 
suffered 95 percent casualties on 25 July, and 
restoring the confidence of a well-trained but 
inexperienced infantry battalion.7  According to 
Brigaider W.J. “Bill” Megill, commander of 5th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade, a battalion operating 
under normal circumstances could suffer 10 
percent casualties per month and keep fighting, 
20 percent casualties would require one month 
of re-training while 30 percent a full two months, 
and so on.8  Despite assurances that the Black 
Watch would be afforded the necessary time to 
absorb reinforcements and retrain, the afternoon 
of 5 August witnessed the newly re-composed rifle 
companies advancing down the road to May-sur-
Orne, a mere ten days after being destroyed in 
the fields east of the village.
 Originally, Megill planned to ease Mitchell’s 
battalion into the line south of the twin towns 
of St. André and St. Martin in a series of small-
scale defensive actions with the dual purpose of 
strengthening unit cohesion and acclimatizing 
reinforcements to life in the Normandy 
bridgehead. It was here that reinforcements 
(some with only 6-8 weeks of total service) came 
under shell and sniper fire for the first time.9 The 
first of these actions occurred during the night of 
4-5 August when the Black Watch relieved units of 
the Fusilier Mont-Royal in the St. André-St.Martin 
area and conducted routine patrolling in the area 
south of the village.10 At 1030 hours, however, the 
routine nature of the day was interrupted when a 
Liaison Officer (LO) from Major-General Charles 
Foulkes’ 2nd Canadian Infantry Division brought 
instructions for 5th Brigade to prevent any enemy 
withdrawal or movement from their front.11 The 
abrupt change of plans stemmed from confirmed 
reports that German units facing the British 53rd 
Infantry Division west of the Orne River had 
withdrawn, leaving Foulkes to wonder if the same 
had occurred on his front.12 Patrols conducted 
during the night did not support this however, and 
Foulkes was informed by his LO that the “enemy 
was still on 5th Brigade’s front.”13 Undaunted, 
a second LO arrived at Megill’s headquarters 
roughly 90 minutes later bringing orders from 
Foulkes to commence “active probing” and follow 
up any sign of enemy withdrawal.14  In response, 
Megill drew up a patrol programme that called 
Senior officers of the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada: Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Michell (left - 
photographed as a major) took command of the battalion following its destruction on 25 July 1944 during the advance 
up Verrières Ridge. Major Tom Anyon (centre) assumed command of “A” Company while Major Ronnie Bennett took 
over “D” Company. On 5 August Mitchell emerged from the second battle of May-sur-Orne unscathed but Anyon and 
Bennett were both killed.  (Black Watch Archives)
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for the Black Watch to launch a company-sized 
fighting patrol to to capture the “chateau” area 
southwest of St. André. If opposition proved 
slight, a second company would pass through 
to the area northeast of May-sur-Orne and probe 
the outskirts of town.15 Finally, at last light, a 
reconnaissance patrol would move south from St. 
Martin to reconnoitre the “factory” and if lightly 
held, a fighting patrol would occupy the structure 
and its environs. 16 
 The leading patrols were about to sortie 
when Foulkes arrived in person at Black Watch 
headquarters just after 1400 hours and informed 
both Mitchell and Megill that the “enemy (was) 
withdrawing his depleted forces” and that the 
Black Watch “MUST keep contact” and “hold” 
the enemy in place so that “a larger plan may be 
successfully accomplished.”17  As a result, the 
limited unit-size patrol programme was set aside 
and a bolder Brigade-level operation adopted.
 In the new three-phased plan, Mitchell’s 
battalion would advance down the St. André/
May-sur-Orne road and capture May-sur-Orne in 
phase I, followed by the Régiment de Maisonneuve 
who would pass through and assault Fontenay-
le-Marmion in phase II. If this proved successful, 
the Calgary Highlanders would move through 
Fontenay-le-Marmion and advance, if possible, 
as far as Bretteville-sur-Laize in the final phase.18  
Support for the Black Watch consisted of artillery 
“on call,” but tank, anti-tank and heavy machine 
gun support was not allocated for their phase 
of the advance. It is unclear whether Foulkes 
withheld all but artillery support due to the 
lack of available armour, or whether he chose to 
reserve it for it for the later phases.19  Either way, 
the Black Watch would advance to May-sur-Orne 
without the benefit of direct fire support.
A Canadian soldier walks through the ruins of May-sur-Orne, 9 August 1944.
Photo by Ken Bell, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) PA 114507
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 With little additional information other than 
patrol reports from the previous night, Mitchell 
was wary of the optimistic portrait painted by 
Foulkes and now parroted by Megill.20 Since 
the debacle on 25 July, a growing acrimony 
between the Black Watch and their superiors 
had developed as each were blamed (to varying 
degrees) for the fate of the battalion in Spring.21 
Futhermore, the consensus opinion within the 
battalion viewed both the Brigade and Division 
commanders as “funnels” for orders from higher 
command with neither displaying the tactical 
acumen, or intestinal fortitude, necessary to 
bring about less than costly results.22 Together, 
their less than convincing justification for the 
hasty change of plan on 5 August did little to 
dissipate the increasing non-confidence. Despite 
his reservations concerning the seemingly overly-
optimistic picture faced by his battalion, Mitchell 
reluctantly placed his faith in providence and 
higher command and ordered the Black Watch 
to cautiously advance along the one kilometre 
stretch of road leading to May-sur-Orne. 
 Just after 1600 hours, the battalion started 
up the road to May-sur-Orne with Major Tom 
Anyon’s “A” Company in the lead. Following 
Anyon were Major Ronnie Bennett’s “D” Company 
with “B” and “C” Companies and Mitchell’s 
headquarters bringing up the rear on the flanks.23 
Mitchell elected to send only 50 men up with 
Anyon in “A” Company, while the rest of his 
“unborn but gallant little company” remained left 
out of battle due to their relative inexperience.24 
Twenty minutes after departing, Mitchell reported 
that the battalion had “encountered no enemy 
at (the) chateau” and that he was pressing on to 
May-sur-Orne.25 Moving in single file down both 
sides of the road at five-yard intervals, the men 
of the Black Watch moved past the bloated and 
decaying bodies of unburied Canadians who fell 
in combat over the previous fortnight.26  It was 
a “disturbing sight,” which “unnerved” some in 
the lead companies, but the advance continued 
without incident until the lead companies 
reached the ruins of the northern outskirts of 
May-sur-Orne.27  
 From German positions in and around 
the town the advance of the Black Watch down 
the main road looked surreal. A veteran of 1st 
SS Panzer Division, Obersturmfuhrer  Preus, 
boasted that he could “scarcely believe (his) eyes” 
when he saw the lead companies advancing in 
plain view of the German guns: 
Their forces were in a picture-book formation 
such as I had never seen in all my years of war. 
One company marched in two rows in close 
formation on the left and right of the road. The 
Company Commander was in front, right in the 
middle of the road…It was simply incredible!28 
According to doctrine, Preus’ men held their 
fire and watched intently as the Black Watch 
cautiously made their way towards May-sur-
Orne following an Allied artillery barrage that 
landed in and around the town. When the lead 
companies entered the northern outskirts of 
May-sur-Orne, the artillery support lifted early 
leaving the men exposed as they crossed final 
100 yards. According to Preus, this presented a 
target that, “was enough to warm our hearts,”29  
and it was here that the 1st SS “snapped the 
trap shut.”30  As the Black Watch war diary noted, 
“not a mortar or 88 had landed within miles” 
until that point when the Germans opened up 
“plastering the lead companies with both, as fast 
as he could load.”31 Both “A” and “D” Companies 
were immediately pinned down in the ditches 
on either side of the road with Anyon and one of 
his platoon commanders being the first to fall in 
what proved to be a costly afternoon.32 Without 
the benefit of anti-tank guns or tank support, 
“A” Company found itself in a dire predicament 
when a German tank “advanced down the 
center of the road,” firing high explosive shells 
and machine gunning the men in the ditches 
either killing or forcing the remainder of “A” 
Company to surrender.33  “D” Company was also 
hit hard and forced to withdraw towards St. 
André-sur-Orne. “B” and “C” Companies, upon 
viewing the slaughter up ahead, desperately 
pleaded in vain with 5th Brigade Headquarters 
for tank support.34 Lacking a positive response 
from Megill’s headquarters Mitchell personally 
intervened at 1820 hours and assured 5th 
Brigade that his companies had indeed “asked 
for (a) reason.”35 It is unclear whether tank 
support did indeed arrive, but either way, “B” and 
“C” Companies adopted holding positions that 
straddled the road to May-sur-Orne where they 
Opposite: This photograph is taken from the northern 
edge of May-sur-Orne. The mine tower in the “factory” 
area is visible at the top left as is the church in St. Martin-
de-Fontenay (top right).  This is essentially the ground 
covered by the Black Watch as they approached May on 
the morning of 5 August 1944.
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remained for the next few days.36 German shelling 
also took its toll on Mitchell’s headquarters 
during their advance behind the lead companies. 
Despite being “constantly where the going was 
the toughest,” Mitchell survived the advance 
without a scratch, but others accompanying the 
Black Watch CO were not so lucky.37 Mitchell’s 
signaller, Corporal S. Smith, was killed by 
shrapnel as he stood next to him while mortar 
shells severely wounded the Battalion Intelligence 
officer, Lieutenant P. Mackenzie, and took the 
life of “D” Company commander Captain R.E. 
Bennett – the sole remaining Black Watch officer 
with combat experience.38 As the Black Watch 
war diarist noted, the afternoon took not only a 
heavy physical toll on its participants, but also 
affected the nerves of many of those who were 
experiencing battle for the first time. “Some of 
the new lads whom we have recently received as 
replacements are taking this action quite hard, 
for most of them are fresh from Canada.”39  
 The costly failure of the operation, coupled 
with its haphazard and seemingly ill-conceived 
nature, served to exacerbate an already tense 
relationship between Mitchell and Megill.40 In 
addition, as no explanation or appreciation 
of the motives that prompted the attack on 5 
August had been available until now, a generation 
of historians has pointed to this attack as an 
illustration of the ineptitude of Canadian High 
Command.41 Fortunately, the recent release of 
classified intelligence material sheds new light 
on the origins of the operation and in particular, 
the hasty manner in which it was carried out.
 Between 27 July and 5 August, events in 
the Normandy bridgehead evolved at a rapid 
pace. During this period it became apparent to 
Allied High Command that American forces in 
the area of St. Lô had achieved a breakout in 
Operation Cobra, and as a result, the complexion 
of the Normandy campaign changed from static 
to fluid on the western end of the bridgehead. 
Unfortunately for Canadian troops to the east, 
their earlier attempts to punch a hole in the 
German line south of Caen had attracted the 
bulk of the German armour reserves to Verrières 
Ridge and forced 21st Army Group commander 
General Bernard Law Montgomery to modify his 
strategy. Realizing that the armoured weight of the 
German defence was too strong along Verrières, 
Montgomery decided late on the evening on 
26 July to pin or “fix” the bulk of the German 
Panzer reserves on the ridge.42 As a result, units 
of the 2nd Canadian Corps were tasked with the 
unenviable role of “holding” the panzers in place. 
 While the Black Watch hurriedly reformed 
its depleted ranks, its sister battalions in the 5th 
Major-General Charles Foulkes (left), commander of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and Brigadier Bill Megill (right), 
commander of 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade were seen as merely “funnelling” orders from high command and as a 
result Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell, commanding officer of the Black Watch, lost confidence in his immediate commanders.
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Canadian Infantry Brigade were committed to 
the holding operation south of Caen by way of a 
series of limited battalion-sized probing attacks 
around the towns of Tilly-la-Campagne and May-
sur-Orne.43 Despite the valiant, and at times 
desperate, efforts of the troops in these assaults, 
the fact remained that the Canadian holding 
attacks along Verrières Ridge did not succeed. 
From 27 July until 5 August, German High 
Command extricated all of its panzer divisions 
from the Canadian front in an effort to plug holes 
in front of the surging American and British 
armies. Allied High Command was painfully 
aware of this situation as ULTRA revealed that the 
2nd, 21st and 116th Panzer, along with the 9th 
and 10th SS Divisions, had already moved west 
of the Orne River by the night of 4-5 August.44 In 
addition, there were strong indications that 1st 
and 12th SS Panzer Divisions were pulling out 
too, headed either into reserve positions around 
Bretteville-sur-Laize or across the Orne River to 
face the British or Americans.45 Neither scenario 
was in the prescribed plans, and Montgomery 
put pressure on First Canadian Army to prepare 
an attack for that afternoon. This was designed 
either to pin the two remaining panzer divisions 
to the Verrières Ridge sector or to take advantage 
of what appeared to be a wide open road to 
Falaise.46
 By 1944 ULTRA had become the “defining 
hand” in Allied intelligence. It was used to guide 
planning and decision-making, and both Army 
and Army Group commanders relied heavily 
on what it had to offer.47 Although Montgomery, 
Crerar and Simonds were aware of ULTRA to 
varying degrees, security restrictions prohibited 
revealing the source of this information to lower 
levels of command. This meant that  Foulkes, 
Megill and others at or below that level had to 
trust that higher command knew what was best.48 
In addition, the security regulations surrounding 
ULTRA made its utilization on the battlefield an 
art in itself. Winterbotham, who was responsible 
for the indoctrination of ULTRA users, made sure 
to press home the point that no action based 
solely on ULTRA could be taken which would 
indicate to German High Command that their 
most secret communications were compromised. 
As a result, there was always a pressing need to 
cover the source of the information and alleviate 
any suspicions about signals security lurking 
in the minds of the German High Command. 
The general approach taken by Allied High 
Command was to utilize reconnaissance flights, 
patrols and battalion-level actions designed to 
either obtain identifications of enemy units or 
capture prisoners. These could then be used to 
foster the illusion that any subsequent decisions 
were generated by these efforts and not signals 
intelligence.49  
 Despite its seemingly Delphic nature, there 
was no guarantee that the intelligence provided by 
ULTRA would be either exact, complete or more 
importantly, interpreted correctly. As a result, 
ULTRA proved to be a double-edged sword. 
If the information gleaned was appreciated 
correctly, and a “cost-efficient” victory ensued, 
then confidence in the abilities of the ULTRA-
indoctrinated command or commander would 
result. However, if an incorrect appreciation, 
defeat or pyrrhic victory resulted, coupled with 
the inability to explain to subordinates the 
reasoning behind such an ULTRA-inspired or 
dictated decision, acrimony and non-confidence 
could ensue. This proved to be the case for 
Foulkes, Megill, and Mitchell as Allied High 
Command failed to draw the proper conclusions 
from ULTRA.
 Unknown to Foulkes, his appearance at 
the front was prompted by a series of ULTRA 
decrypts that arrived at First Canadian Army 
Headquarters just before noon. These indicated 
that a pull out by the 1st SS had begun during 
the night.50 Although ULTRA revealed that a 
staged withdrawal was indeed taking place, First 
Canadian Army Intelligence was not convinced of 
the currency of the ULTRA and suspected that 
the withdrawal may have been completed by 
midday. To confirm this supposition, Crerar’s 
Headquaters contacted 2nd Canadian Corps 
at 1330 hours and ordered their divisions to 
“push their necks out.”51 Within 15 minutes, 
Elliot Rodger (Chief of Staff at 2nd Canadian 
Corps) contacted Foulkes who came to Mitchell’s 
headquarters in person a short time later, and 
expanded the scope and nature of the operations.52 
Due to the strict security regulations, the reasons 
behind this could not be disseminated to division, 
brigade or battalion levels; thus when Foulkes 
and Megill issued orders without putting Mitchell 
into the complete picture, their conduct was 
Opposite: This air photograph, taken on 16 July 1944, 
shows the southern edge of St. Martin-de-Fontenay, the 
“Chateau,” the “Factory” as well as May-sur-Orne. 
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influenced by the fact that they too were ignorant 
concerning the detailed motives underpinning the 
operation. It is quite likely that Foulkes and Megill 
were also similarly informed that the operation 
was imperative so that a “larger plan could be 
carried out.” Not only did they have to accept 
this explanation, but in turn, had to issue orders 
to their subordinates based on this ambiguous 
rationale. As a result, the impression left with 
Mitchell, particularly post facto, was that Foulkes 
and Megill were simply funnelling orders from 
high command. On the surface, this was indeed 
correct; not due to any failings of their own, but 
rather to the structural constraints of a highly 
secret source of intelligence of which they were 
unaware and to which all three were unwitting 
servants. Should the advance on May-sur-Orne 
have been a complete, or less-costly, success, it is 
likely that this impression would not have taken 
root with Mitchell. However, as the operation 
concluded with heavy losses and what appeared 
to be little or no tangible gain, the prima facie 
reasons given did not hold water for the ULTRA 
un-indoctrinated, leaving a misleading legacy of 
professional ineptitude for over six decades.
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